Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and two characterizations on subclasses of games are provided.
Introduction
In this paper we introduce and study three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs. An example of a cooperative situation with uncertain payoffs is the following. Two firms will be temporarily working together in an R&D project. Although the profit of this project is yet uncertain, the firms sign a contract beforehand in which their profit shares are written down.
Cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced in Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000) . In these games the payoff to a coalition is not known with certainty and is modelled as a random variable.
Further, the preferences of the players and the possible allocations of the payoffs are of a specific type.
Another model of games where the payoffs to the coalitions are random variables is the model of stochastic cooperative games as discussed in Suijs (2000) . The difference between these games and cooperative games with random payoffs lies in the assumptions on the preferences and the structure of the set of possible allocations of the payoffs (see Timmer et al. (2000) ).
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) is a solution concept for cooperative TU games for which several equivalent formulations exist. One of these formulations is that the Shapley value equals the average of the marginal vectors. Suijs (2000) considered this formulation of the Shapley value but was not able to extend it to his model of stochastic cooperative games because, among others, a marginal vector of a stochastic cooperative game need not be uniquely defined. Nevertheless, the nucleolus, a solution concept for TU games that we do not discuss here, has been successfully extended to stochastic cooperative games (cf. Suijs (1996 Suijs ( , 2000 ).
Inspired by the equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for TU games we define three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. We study properties of these solution concepts and give two characterizations on subclasses of games. The first one is on the class of games where all players have identical preferences of a specific 'linear' type. On this class of games with random payoffs the three solution concepts coincide. The second one is a characterization on the class of one-person and two-person games, where again the three solutions coincide. These two characterizations are based on characterizations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games by Young (1985) , and by Myerson (1980) , Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Ortmann (1998) , respectively. Further, an example shows that the solutions may all be different for three-person games. This paper is organized in four sections. In section 2 we briefly recall the main basic features of cooperative games with random payoffs. The three solution concepts are introduced in section 3. In section 4 properties of the solution concepts are studied and the two characterizations are provided.
Finally, an appendix contains the proofs that are omitted in the text.
Cooperative games with random payoffs
A cooperative game with random payoffs is a tuple (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ). N is the finite player set. A coalition is a nonempty subset of N . The nonnegative random payoff to coalition S is 2 denoted by R(S) and S is the set of coalitions with a nonzero payoff. The set A contains all possible individual payoffs that a player may receive from the coalitional payoffs and α i is a function that describes how player i compares two random payoffs. Below we explain these ingredients in more detail.
Let N = {1, . . ., n}. Denote by |S| the cardinality of coalition S. Let L + be the set of all nonnegative random variables with finite expectation. The payoff zero for sure is denoted by 0.
The payoff R(S) to coalition S is assumed to be an element of L + . S is the set of coalitions with a nonzero payoff, S = {S ⊂ N |R(S) = 0, S = ∅}. We assume the following about the payoffs.
The reason for this assumption is explained in section 3.
Assumption 2.1 If R(T ) = 0 for some coalition T then R(S) = 0 for all coalitions S such that
An allocation of the payoff R(S) to the members of S is a multiple pR(S) with p ∈ IR S and where player i ∈ S receives p i R(S). Such an allocation is efficient if i∈S p i = 1. For ease of
all the payoffs that a player may receive from an allocation of the coalitional payoffs with respect to S. All nonzero payoffs in A are denoted by A −0 = {pR(S) ∈ A|p = 0}.
The preference relation of player i is denoted by i and it has the following interpretation. If X i Y then agent i weakly prefers X to Y . If he is indifferent between them, X ∼ i Y , then Y i X and X i Y , and if he strictly prefers X to Y , X i Y then X i Y and not X ∼ i Y . We assume the following about this preference relation.
Assumption 2.2 For all i ∈ N there exists a surjective, coordinatewise strictly increasing and continuous function
Some examples of preference relations that satisfy this assumption are the following. Let E(X) denote the expectation of X. If X i Y if and only if E(X) ≥ E(Y ), X, Y ∈ A, then f i S (t) = t/E(R(S)) for all S ∈ S, i ∈ N, t ∈ IR, represents this preference relation. This type of preferences is called 'expectation preferences'.
A second example involves quantiles of random variables. The β i -quantile of the random variable
Define the (utility) function
describe these so-called 'quantile preferences'. Notice that both expectation and quantile preferences have
Further, define α i (0, 0) = 1. We do not define α i (pR(S), 0), pR(S) ∈ A −0 , because it can be derived from assumption 2.2 that we have
Some interesting and often used properties of the functions α i , i ∈ N , are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3
For all players i ∈ N it holds that α i (hX, X) = h for any h ∈ IR, X ∈ A −0 .
If for player i ∈ N the functions f i S , S ∈ S, are linear then
Proof. Let i ∈ N , h ∈ IR and X ∈ A −0 . By definition of α i it holds that hX ∼ i α i (hX, X)X.
From assumption 2.2 we derive that the preference relation i is monotone increasing and this implies that h = α i (hX, X).
Secondly, let player i have linear functions f i S , S ∈ S. For pR(S) ∈ A and qR(T ) ∈ A −0 we get
where the first equality is by definition of α i and the other equalities follow from the linearity of
where the first equivalence comes from assumption 2.2 and the second one from the linearity of the functions f i S , S ∈ S.
3 The marginal, dividend and selector values
The Shapley value for cooperative TU games is a solution for which several equivalent formulations exist. Based on these formulations, we define three solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs.
We start with some definitions. A cooperative TU game is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . ., n} is the finite set of players, v(∅) = 0 and v(S) ∈ IR is the worth of coalition S. Let Π(N ) be the set of all bijections σ : {1, . . . , n} → N of N , S for i = 1, . . . , n. The Shapley value φ(v) is equal to the average of the marginal vectors:
for all i ∈ N . For cooperative games with random payoffs we define marginal vectors as follows. Let
is the marginal contribution of player σ(i) to coalition S σ i−1 . This contribution is the remainder of R(S σ i ) after the players in S σ i−1 received parts that they find equivalent to their marginal contributions. Assumption 2.1 is necessary to avoid situations where
with random payoffs and with player set N . A solution for cooperative games with random payoffs is a function
In a straightforward way we define the marginal value 3 Φ m for cooperative games with random payoffs as the average of the marginal vectors.
A second formulation of φ(v) uses the dividends per capita d S (v) of the coalitions S, as introduced by Harsanyi (1959) . These numbers are calculated in a recursive way:
Now the Shapley value of (N, v) can be written as
for all i ∈ N . For a cooperative game with random payoffs G we define the dividend per capita d S (G) of coalition S as follows:
3 In Timmer et al. (2000) this value is called the Shapley value. Here, we consider three values based on the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. To avoid confusion, we have renamed this value as the marginal value.
5
The dividend per capita of a one-person coalition is equal to its payoff. If S contains more than one player then we start with its payoff R(S). Given a subset T of S, T = S, we give each player j ∈ T the dividend per capita d T (G) expressed as a multiple of R(S). After we have done so for all sets T ⊂ S, T = S, we divide the remainder of R(S) by |S| to obtain the dividend per capita. The dividend value Φ d is an extension of (3.2) and is defined by
for all i ∈ N . Player i receives the dividends per capita, expressed in multiples of R(N ), of all the coalitions to which he belongs.
A third formulation is given by Derks, Haller and Peters (2000) and
for all i ∈ N , player i receives the dividends of those coalitions S for which γ(S) = i, and we have
For a cooperative game with random payoffs G define the dividend of coalition S, ∆ S (G), by
The dividend ∆ S (G) of a one-person coalition S is equal to its dividend per capita, namely R(S).
For coalitions S with more than one player we take a subset T of S. The dividend ∆ T (G) is divided equally among the players in T . Player j ∈ T receives the amount
which is equivalent for him to ∆ T (G)/|T |. The dividend of coalition S is all that remains of R(S)
after the dividends of the subcoalitions T have been divided. The following lemma shows that the dividend ∆ S (G) is closely related to the dividend per capita d S (G).
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a cooperative game with random payoffs and let S be a coalition. We show by induction that ∆ S (G) = |S|d S (G).
for all coalitions T with 1 ≤ |T | ≤ k, k < |N|. Let S be a coalition with |S| = k + 1. We obtain
where the second equality follows from induction and the third equality from the definition of the dividend per capita d S (G).
2
The selector vector
The selector value Φ s is the average of these selector vectors,
A first remark on these definitions is that a marginal vector need not be a selector vector, as opposed to the case for cooperative TU games. Secondly, notice that M γ (G) need not be an efficient allocation of R(N ) even if G is a game where all the functions f i are linear. The example below illustrates this.
Example 3.2 Consider the game G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) where N = {1, 2, 3} and the [3, 7] ), that is, R(N) is uniformly distributed over the interval [3, 7] . We see that S = {{3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, N } and A = {pR(S)|S ∈ S, p ∈ IR} by definition.
Let β 1 = β 3 = 1/2 and β 2 = 1/4. Recall from section 2 that u X
is the β i -quantile of the random variable X. All the players i ∈ N have quantile preferences, thus
for all i ∈ N , S ∈ S, t ∈ IR. From this we obtain the maps α i for all i ∈ N .
The dividends of the various coalitions are 
4 Properties and characterizations on subclasses of games
In this section we present properties of the solution concepts that we introduced in the previous section.
For two subclasses of games where the three solution concepts coincide we provide characterizations of these solutions.
(iii) satisfies anonymity if for all G ∈ G N and for all σ ∈ Π(N ) we have
where
(iv) satisfies the null player property if for all G ∈ G N , for all i ∈ N such that R({i}) = 0 and
The three solution concept satisfy most of these properties. Proof. We only show the efficiency of Φ d . The remainder of the proof is left to the reader.
Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a game with random payoffs. The dividend per capita of coalition N is by definition
By lemma 2.3 we have
for all i ∈ N . Summing both sides over N gives
Rearranging terms leads to
Hence, i∈N S:i∈S
where the last equality follows from (4.3). We conclude that Φ d is an efficient allocation of R(N ). 2
We introduce another property based on its counterpart for TU games as in Young (1985) .
(v) A solution concept Ψ on G N satisfies strong monotonicity if for all i ∈ N and for all games
Now we have the following result.
Lemma 4.2 The marginal value Φ m satisfies strong monotonicity on the class of all games G where
where all the functions f i are linear. Let i ∈ N be such that 
for all permutations σ where variables without (with) an accent refer to the game G (G ). Applying statement 2 of lemma 2.3 gives
for all σ ∈ Π(N ). This implies that
and once again by statement 2 of lemma 2.3 we get
Similar reasoning shows that this result also holds if R(N ) = 0 and Q(N ) = 0 or if R(N ) = 0 and
The following example shows that this result need not hold if one of the functions f i is not linear. 
Similarly we obtain M We conclude that the marginal value does not satisfy strong monotonicity.
3
The selector value and the dividend value are equal for games where all the players i ∈ N have linear functions f i .
Theorem 4.4 If G is a game where all the players have linear functions f i then the selector value and the dividend value coincide.
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a game where f i is a linear function for all i ∈ N .
From lemma 3.1 we know that ∆ S (G) = |S|d S (G) for all coalitions S. By the linearity of f i and by statement 1 of lemma 2.3 we have
where the fourth equality follows from γ(S) ∈ S.
2
A corollary of this theorem is that Φ s is an efficient solution for any game G where all the functions f i are linear.
Denote by GLI N the set of games G with player set N where all the players have identical linear functions f i . The marginal, dividend and selector value coincide on this class of games.
Theorem 4.5 For all
Let σ ∈ Π(N ) be a permutation of N . We show by induction that m
where the second equality follows from statement 1 of lemma 2.3. For R({σ(1)}) = 0 this result also
and so,
holds for the same reason as above.
Similar reasoning as for the marginal vectors shows that
coalitions S and i ∈ N . Thus we have
and by (3.1) and (3.2)
for all players i ∈ N .
2
Furthermore, there exists a characterization of these solution concepts on the class of games GLI N . This characterization is based on a characterization of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games by Young (1985) .
Theorem 4.6
The marginal value Φ m is the unique solution concept on GLI N that satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity.
Proof. From the lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 it follows that Φ m satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity on GLI N .
To show the uniqueness, let Ψ be a solution concept on GLI N that satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) ∈ GLI N and let (N, v) be the corresponding TU game as in the proof of lemma 4.5. By efficiency there is a p ∈ ∆ * (N ) such
This ψ is a solution concept on the class of TU games
ψ satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity as defined for cooperative TU games by Young (1985) . In theorem A.1 of the appendix we show that the Shapley value φ is the unique solution on SG N that satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Hence,
and 
2
We will now turn our attention to games with random payoffs that need not have linear functions
M be the class of cooperative games with random payoffs and player set N , and all of its subgames. A sixth property for solution concepts onḠ N is based on the balanced contributions property for cooperative TU games by Myerson (1980) .
(vi) A solution concept Ψ onḠ N is said to have balanced contributions if for all games G ∈ G N , for all coalitions T ⊂ N and for all i, j ∈ T , i = j, we have
We have the following results concerning two-person games. Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a two-person game with N = {1, 2}. If R(N) = 0 then R({1}) = R({2}) = 0 by assumption 2.1. For any of the two permutations σ we have Now assume that R(N ) = 0. Let σ 1 (1) = 1, σ 1 (2) = 2, σ 2 (1) = 2 and σ 2 (2) = 1. The corresponding marginal vectors are
Lemma 4.7 If G is a two-person game then
and the marginal value equals
The dividends per capita are d {i} (G) = R({i}), i = 1, 2, for the one-person coalitions and for the
. There are only two selector functions, namely γ 1 and γ 2 defined by γ 1 ({i}) = γ 2 ({i}) = i, i ∈ N, γ 1 (N) = 1 and γ 2 (N ) = 2. The dividends are ∆ {i} (G) = R({i}), i = 1, 2, and
We conclude that the selector value Φ s (G), the average of the selector vectors, coincides with the marginal value Φ m (G), the average of the marginal vectors.
Finally, we check balanced contributions for the grand coalition N . By efficiency Φ m i (G {i} ) = R({i}) for i = 1, 2. We have
14 We conclude that Φ m has balanced contributions.
2
Moreover, we have the following characterization, which is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Ortmann (1998) . To show the uniqueness, let Ψ be a solution concept onḠ N that is efficient and has balanced contributions. If G ∈Ḡ N is a one-person game then Ψ(G) = Φ m (G) because of efficiency.
Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a two-person game. By efficiency there exists a vector
Next to this, Ψ has balanced contributions:
By efficiency we have
Using p 1 + p 2 = 1 leads to
from which we conclude that Ψ = Φ m .
2
Of course, this characterization also holds for the dividend value and the selector value, as lemma 4.7 indicates. For three-person games, the three solution concepts can all be different, as the following example shows.
Example 4.9 Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be the three-person game with N = {1, 2, 3}, R({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N , R(S) = 1 if |S| = 2 and R(N ) is uniformly distributed over the closed interval [3, 7] . The players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and for player 2 we have
For this game the four solution concepts are Φ m (G) = (19/60, 11/30, 19/60) 
Notice that the selector value is not efficient. Further,
. This is due to the fact that both the players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and so, linear functions f i . The
3

A Appendix
In this appendix we provide a characterization of the Shapley value on the class of TU games In the proof of this theorem we need a lemma that we present below. First, we introduce some definitions. Let the game (N, u T ) be the so-called unanimity game defined by For t ∈ {1, . . ., n} define ∆ t (v) = max T :|T |=t ∆ T (v). Let v 1 = T =∅ ∆ |T| (v)u T . Clearly, v 1 is symmetric, that is, v 1 (S 1 ) = v 1 (S 2 ) for all coalitions S 1 , S 2 such that |S 1 | = |S 2 |.
for all t ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Furthermore, 
According to (A.6) we can rewrite this to
By lemma A.2 w i ∈ SG N and k(w i ) ≤ k(v) − 1 = k − 1. Then g(w i ) = φ(w i ) (A.7)
by induction.
